
Lessons from David Chalmers
David Chalmers is a philosopher at New York University who works on philosophy of mind and cognitive science and formulated the “hard problem” of consciousness. This collection gathers sentences from his own papers and interviews. — David Chalmers on the nature and ethics of consciousness (80,000 Hours Podcast).
Part 1: The Hard Problem of Consciousness
- On the hard problem: David Chalmers: "The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience." — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On the easy problems: David Chalmers: "The methods of cognitive science are well-suited for this sort of explanation, and so are well-suited to the easy problems of consciousness." — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On a rich inner life: David Chalmers: "Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all?" — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On quiddities: David Chalmers: "Here we can say that quiddities are the fundamental categorical properties that play the fundamental roles specified in physics." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
- On the meta-problem: David Chalmers: "The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain." — The Meta-Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On the basic furniture of the world: David Chalmers: "The fundamental laws of nature are part of the basic furniture of the world, and physical theories are telling us that this basic furniture is remarkably simple." — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On new basic properties and laws: David Chalmers: "New basic properties and basic laws were needed to give a satisfactory account of the phenomena." — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On what cannot be captured structurally: David Chalmers: "There are properties of experience, such as the intrinsic nature of a sensation of red, that cannot be fully captured in a structural description." — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On explaining access and reportability: David Chalmers: "To explain access and reportability, for example, we need only specify the mechanism by which information about internal states is retrieved and made available for verbal report." — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On naturalistic dualism: David Chalmers: "If the position is to have a name, a good choice might be naturalistic dualism." — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
Part 2: Philosophical Zombies & Materialism
- On type-A materialism: David Chalmers: "Type-A materialists reject the epistemic premise, holding for example that zombies are not conceivable." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
- On the conceivability argument: David Chalmers: "The argument for the antithesis is the conceivability argument for dualism (and against materialism)." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
- On panpsychism and dualism: David Chalmers: "Still, as we will see, nonconstitutive panpsychism inherits many of the problems of dualism, while it is constitutive panpsychism that offers hope for a Hegelian synthesis." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
- On epiphenomenalism: David Chalmers: "Epiphenomenalists reject premise (1), holding that the claim that consciousness causes behavior is just an intuition and can be rejected." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
- On analytic functionalism: David Chalmers: "As a result, analytic functionalism seems to be psychologically inadequate in addressing the meta-problem." — The Meta-Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On structuralist physics: David Chalmers: "There are respectable structuralist or dispositionalist views of physics on which physics involves just structure or dispositions all the way down." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
Part 4: Virtual Reality and Technophilosophy
- On a meaningful hypothesis about simulation: David Chalmers: "Yeah, I think the simulation hypothesis is a perfectly meaningful hypothesis about the world." — David Chalmers on the nature and ethics of consciousness (80,000 Hours Podcast, his turns).
- On a claim about the reality beneath physics: David Chalmers: "A metaphysical hypothesis might make a claim about the reality that underlies physics itself." — The Matrix as Metaphysics (David J. Chalmers).
- On illusionism and the hard problem: David Chalmers: "Illusionists typically hold that a solution to the meta-problem will itself solve or dissolve the hard problem." — The Meta-Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
Part 5: Panpsychism & Fundamental Properties
- On what panpsychism means: David Chalmers: "We can understand panpsychism as the thesis that some fundamental physical entities have mental states." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
- On panpsychism taken literally: David Chalmers: "Panpsychism, taken literally, is the doctrine that everything has a mind." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
- On the constraints on a fundamental theory: David Chalmers: "Finally, the fact that we are searching for a fundamental theory means that we can appeal to such nonempirical constraints as simplicity, homogeneity, and the like in developing a theory." — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On panprotopsychism: David Chalmers: "Recall that panprotopsychism is the view that fundamental physical entities are protoconscious." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
- On the combination problem: David Chalmers: "The combination problem for panpsychism is to explain how micro-consciousnesses can combine to yield our consciousness." — The Meta-Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On constitutive Russellian panpsychism: David Chalmers: "I think that constitutive Russellian panpsychism is perhaps the most important form of panpsychism, precisely because it is this form that promises to avoid the problems of physicalism and dualism and to serve as a Hegelian synthesis." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
- On the subject-subject problem: David Chalmers: "I am inclined to think the subject-subject problem is more difficult, and that panprotopsychism may benefit from having fewer constraints on its building blocks, but I am far from certain about this." — Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism (David J. Chalmers).
Part 6: Artificial Intelligence & the Singularity
- On the intelligence explosion: David Chalmers: "This intelligence explosion is now often known as the “singularity”." — The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis (David J. Chalmers).
- On partial uploading: David Chalmers: "Once people are confronted with friends and family who have undergone limited partial uploading and are behaving normally, few people will seriously think that they lack consciousness." — The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis (David J. Chalmers).
- On zombies as a logical possibility: David Chalmers: "Of course it remains at least a logical possibility that this process will gradually or suddenly turn everyone into zombies." — The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis (David J. Chalmers).
- On the moral calculus: David Chalmers: "The moral value of this path is less clear: given the choice between emulating and enhancing human beings and creating an objectively better species, it is possible to see the moral calculus as going either way." — The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis (David J. Chalmers).
- On AI+: David Chalmers: "Let us say that AI+ is artificial intelligence of greater than human level (that is, more intelligent than the most intelligent human)." — The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis (David J. Chalmers).
- On studying the first AI systems: David Chalmers: "In this way we can carefully study the properties of the first AI and AI+ systems to determine whether we want to proceed down the relevant path, before creating related systems that will create more intelligent systems in turn." — The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis (David J. Chalmers).
- On resource limits: David Chalmers: "Regarding resource limitations, it is worth noting that most feedback loops in nature run out of steam because of limitations in resources such as energy, and the same is possible here." — The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis (David J. Chalmers).
- On our place after the singularity: David Chalmers: "To determine whether we can play a significant role in a post-singularity world, we need to know whether human identity can survive the enhancing of our cognitive systems, perhaps through uploading onto new technology." — The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis (David J. Chalmers).
Part 7: The Matrix & Simulation Theory
- On envatted brains as a metaphysical hypothesis: David Chalmers: "I will argue that the hypothesis that I am envatted is not a skeptical hypothesis, but a metaphysical hypothesis." — The Matrix as Metaphysics (David J. Chalmers).
- On creation myths: David Chalmers: "Many of the same issues that arise with standard creation myths arise here." — The Matrix as Metaphysics (David J. Chalmers).
- On the Matrix as a creation myth: David Chalmers: "We can think of the Matrix Hypothesis as a creation myth for the information age." — The Matrix as Metaphysics (David J. Chalmers).
- On what makes a hypothesis skeptical: David Chalmers: "It seems to be a skeptical hypothesis: a hypothesis that I cannot rule out, and one that would falsify most of my beliefs if it were true." — The Matrix as Metaphysics (David J. Chalmers).
Part 8: The Future of Philosophy & Metaphilosophy
- On convergence on the big questions: David Chalmers: "Here is my central thesis: There has not been large collective convergence to the truth on the big questions of philosophy." — Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy? (David J. Chalmers).
- On reductive methods: David Chalmers: "I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem." — Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (David J. Chalmers).
- On verbal disputes evaporating: David Chalmers: "This potential evaporation is one of the central marks of a verbal dispute." — Verbal Disputes (David J. Chalmers).
- On the bridge between words and conclusions: David Chalmers: "If one wants to draw non-linguistic conclusions while avoiding verbal disputes, one needs to be explicit about the bridge, and ideally one should be prepared to cast the conclusion without using the key expression." — Verbal Disputes (David J. Chalmers).
- On diagnosing verbal disputes: David Chalmers: "Here we can see the diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress." — Verbal Disputes (David J. Chalmers).
- On methods that compel agreement: David Chalmers: "The hard sciences have methods—proof in the case of mathematics, and the observational/experimental method in physics, chemistry, and biology—that have the power to compel agreement on the answers to the big question." — Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy? (David J. Chalmers).
- On no limits to human capacity: David Chalmers: "We may need to develop new methods, increased discipline, new sorts of insights, and perhaps there will need to be a conceptual revolution or two, but none of this will lie outside human capacity." — Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy? (David J. Chalmers).
- On remote data: David Chalmers: "An answer naturally suggested by the discussion of decisive arguments is that there is less convergence in philosophy than in science because philosophy tends to concern domains that are remote from clear data." — Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy? (David J. Chalmers).
- On progress without convergence: David Chalmers: "Despite this lack of convergence, it is hard to deny that the insights of Plato and Aristotle, Hume and Kant, Frege and Russell, Kripke and Lewis have involved significant philosophical progress." — Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy? (David J. Chalmers).
- On a possible intelligence explosion in philosophy: David Chalmers: "The resulting intelligence explosion might lead to creatures who could finally answer the big philosophical questions." — Why Isn’t There More Progress in Philosophy? (David J. Chalmers).